

13 March 1957


MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Millard Lewis  
Director of Intelligence, USAF

Confirming my conversation with Mr. John S. Patton of your office, the Director of CIA has no objection to the attached proposed statement to be made in reply to Congressman Miller's question to Secretary Quarles on the reliability of intelligence now as compared to twelve months ago.

The Director had one suggestion which I have conveyed to Mr. Patton. In the first sentence of paragraph 2, page 2, add the word "immediately" after years. Thus the sentence would read: In the heavy bomber field, it was not certain in the years immediately following the war etc.

I also advised Mr. Patton that should Secretary Quarles be queried as to whether his statement had been checked with CIA the Director would have no objection to an affirmative answer. The Director would prefer, however, that any indication of CIA concurrence be "off the record".

(Signed)



STAT

O/DCI:JSE/ekt

Executive Assistant  
to the Director

O&1 - Addressee

1 - DDCI w/cy att.

1 - JSE

1 - ER w/cy att.

Att. Proposed Statement

C O P Y

four to six years to develop an atomic weapon. In fact, the Soviets detonated their first test weapon in mid 1949, several years ahead of the earlier estimate. Second, the Soviet transition from the World War II manufacture of relatively simple, tactical aircraft, largely in relocated factories, to a capability to produce thousands of jet aircraft of the quality of MIG-15 fighters and IL-28 light bombers was achieved more quickly than had been estimated. In fact, the fighter aircraft which we encountered in numbers over Korea were estimated to be a part of some 13,000 MIG-15's which the Soviets are believed to have produced in approximately six years.

In the heavy bomber field, it was not certain in the years following the war that the USSR would build a long range air force equipped with more modern aircraft than the TU-4, the Soviet copy of the B-29. Nevertheless, in the light of their avowed aims of aggression, it was logical that they would have to acquire a strategic striking force to add to their military strengths in other areas. In 1953 we learned of a possible turboprop heavy bomber. Based on this and other information, as well as U. S. experience in developing, producing, equipping and training a long range jet air force, it was estimated that the Soviets would begin to produce modern heavy bombers as replacements for the TU-4 at a very low rate in 1954. However, Soviet air activities over Moscow in 1955 resulted in the display of a much larger number of two types of modern heavy bombers